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SECTION 1.0: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA IN TIME AND SPACE 
 
[the discussion in the section should be complemented by examination of the 
materials in file "Part A: Overview Maps and Tables"] 
 
Section 1.1: Key Administrative, Geographical, and Economic Features 
The 31 provinces of China cover 9.6 million square kilometers and stretches from 
the temperate to sub-tropical zones.  China is similar in size and climate to the United 
States but its topography is quite different.  The most important difference being that the 
U.S. has coastlines running the length of its eastern and western borders, whereas western 
China is landlocked.  China is also more mountainous and hilly, with plains at less than 
500m elevation making up only 25 percent of the total land area, and mountains and 
plateaus accounting for 60 percent.  These topographic features of China imply higher 
transportation costs and a greater requirement for physical infrastructure construction.  
The task of economic development in China is hence more challenging than in the U.S.A. 
Physically, China resembles a three-step staircase running downward from west 
to east.  It begins with the 4,000 meters high Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in the west, proceeds 
to the highlands and basins in the center which are about 1,000 to 2,000 meters above the 
sea level, and ends with hilly regions and plains that are less than 1,000 meters high.  The 
combination of higher precipitation, warmer climate, and access to navigable rivers and 
the sea have made the central and eastern provinces more conducive for farming and 
trade, and, hence, the population centers of China.  The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau was 
traditionally the poorest region.   3
The location of China’s economic center has changed over time, moving 
eastwards from the Loess Plateau and the Yellow River Valley in the northwest (where 
Chinese civilization began in 2000 BC), which is about 1,000 kilometers away from the 
coast.  The reason for this original location is because, in ancient times, high agricultural 
productivity and land-based trade was much more important than sea-based trade.  The 
bulk of China’s international trade at that time was conducted through the famous Silk 
Route that went through the northwestern corner of China.   The southeastern coastal 
region, where Guangdong and Fujian (two of today’s most dynamic provincial 
economies) are located, largely remained uncultivated and sparsely populated in early 
Chinese history.  Although the natural conditions in the southeast were favorable for 
agriculture, farming was undeveloped because malaria (‘zhangqi’ in Chinese) and other 
subtropical diseases checked population growth, and the high temperature sapped human 
energy faster, resulting in lower labor productivity.  Guangdong was considered an 
almost uninhabitable place in ancient times.  
Over time, the pressure of expanding population and the frequent invasions by the 
northern tribes caused more of the population to move south and into the mid-coastal and 
southeastern regions.  By the 12
th century, the Yangtze River valley had become very 
developed and densely populated.  The economic importance of the coastal region 
increased dramatically after the Opium War in 1840 when the Western powers forced 
China to first open several ports and then the whole country for trade.  China’s economy 
and subsequently politics were quickly (by historical standards) transformed.  
International trade expanded, foreign direct investments flowed in, and local industrialists 
made their appearances, especially in the mid-coastal and southeast regions.  The Qing   4
dynasty was overthrown in 1911, followed by a long chaotic period of protracted civil 
wars and Japanese colonialism, that ended with the foundation of the People’s Republic 
of China on October 1, 1949 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) under the 
leadership of Mao Zedong.  
The key geographical and economic
1 characteristics of China's 31 provinces allow 
a quite natural classification of the 31 provinces into six regional categories that are 
useful for analyzing the post-1978 period, see Table A.1 in Part A.
2 
The metropolises of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai that have province-level status 
(Chongqing was granted province-level status in 1997, but we have included its data 
under Sichuan province).  These are the richest pockets of China, and have had high 
growth in the 1990s.  These cities are highly industrialized, and over 71 percent of their 
population lives within 100 kilometers of the coast or navigable waters.  Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin are the exceptionally rich (city) provinces. 
The northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, which are 
collectively called Manchuria, and were the industrial heartland of China in 1949 
(because of the Japanese control of the economy that started in 1905
3).  During the 
central planning period, their early start in industrialization was consolidated, making 
these provinces the part of China that most resembled the Soviet Union in industrial 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the income data in Sections 1 and 2 are from National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS, 1999).  The three main components (primary, secondary and tertiary sectors) of provincial GDP are 
recalculated at 1995 prices, and then summed up to obtain the real GDP series of the province measured in 
1995 prices.  GDP data for Tibet and Hainan were available only after 1978.  In Sections 1 and 2, 
Chongqing data were consolidated with there of Sichuan by updating Sichuan data from State Statistical 
Bureau (1997) from 1996 onward with data on Chongqing and Sichuan in subsequent years of the China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
2 As to be noted later, the geographical delineation of China has varied from one study to another.  As the 
same term (e.g. coastal) can refer to different subsets of provinces, we shall try to indicate to the reader 
whenever the regional term changes meaning in our discussion of the literature. 
3 The Japanese started their economic penetration into Manchuria in 1895 after defeating China over the 
control of Korea, began their economic domination from 1905 by taking over Russian economic interests, 
rendered Manchuria a puppet state after 1911, and formally annexed Manchuria in 1935.   5
organization and production structure.  In the national ranking of per capita GDP, 
omitting the three metropolises, Heilongjiang and Liaoning ranked first and second, 
respectively, in 1978, and ranked seventh and fifth, respectively, in 1998.  Heilongjiang 
and Liaoning are the traditionally rich provinces. 
The coastal provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong 
and Hainan (Hainan was separated out from Guangdong in 1988).   These seven 
provinces have 82 percent of their population living with 100 kilometers of the sea or 
navigable rivers.  They have grown the fastest of these six groupings in the 1978-1998 
period, at an annual average of 10.7 percent.  The result is that Zhejiang and Guangdong 
have soared to the top of the per capita GDP ranking, omitting the metropolises, from 
fourth and sixth, respectively, in 1978 to first and second, respectively, in 1998.  Zhejiang 
and Guangdong are the archetype of the nouveau riche provinces. 
The central provinces of Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi, 
through which the plain runs relatively unimpeded from the north of the Yellow River to 
the south of the Yangtze River.  The temperature and rainfall make this region the 
agricultural heartland of China, which explains why its population density is almost twice 
that of the northeastern and southwestern regions.  The two large rivers and their many 
tributaries endow 57 percent of the population with easy water transportation.  The 
Yangtze between Wuhan and Shanghai has the industrial potential of the Rhone Valley 
multiplied several times. 
The northwestern provinces of Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet (data of Tibet omitted) are truly isolated.  The center of the 
land mass is 1,400 kilometers from the coast.  This region is more arid and steeper   6
compared to the four previous groupings, and it is marked by desert on its western and 
northern borders. Furthermore, 5 percent of the land has a slope of greater than 10 
percent compared to 2.5 percent for the northeastern, coastal and central provinces.  The 
general lack of water makes the region difficult for agriculture, only 8 percent of the land 
is arable, which helps explain why it has the lowest population density in China in 1998, 
46 persons per km
2 versus 126 persons per km
2 in the southwestern region, which has the 
next lowest population density.  A large number of residents are of Turkic origin, and are 
practicing Muslims.
4  The Han people are in the minority in Xinjiang and Tibet. 
The southwestern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi have 
rainfall and temperature conditions that are ideal for crop cultivation but they suffer from 
being too mountainous.  The average elevation is 1,400 kilometers, the average slope is 
5.2 degrees, and 14 percent of the land has a slope of greater than 10 degrees.  The 
proportion of arable land of 10 percent is barely above that of the arid northwestern 
provinces.  Lacking the mineral resources of the northwestern provinces, the 
southwestern provinces have the lowest GDP per capita in 1978, and the lowest growth 
rates in the period of market-oriented reform.  A significant proportion of the population 
belongs to non-Han ethnic groups. 
Table A.2 report the GDP, production structure, population and employment of 
China's 31 provinces in 2001.  The six richest provinces (the three metropolises, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Jiangsu) are all coastal, and they have at least 27 percent of 
                                                 
4 In the 1950s, 3.5 million of Xinjiang's population of 5 million were Muslims Uighurs, with Han Chinese 
accounting for less than 200,000.  It is estimated that 6 million Han Chinese have settled there since then, 
bringing the total population to about 16 million in 1994, with 62 percent belonging to non-Han ethnic 
groups.  Data are from “Wang Enmao, 87, Who Ruled a Rebellious Chinese Province”, The New York 
Times, April 23, 2001, and “Xinjiang’s Minorities Feel Torn Between Desire for Independence, Benefit of 
Economic Reform”, The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, September 5, 1994.   7
their workforce in the secondary industry and at most 42 percent of the labor force in 
agriculture.  Five of the six poorest provinces (Guizhou, Gansu, Guangxi, Yunnan, 
Shaanxi, and Anhui) are located inland, and these six poorest provinces have at most 17 
percent of their labor force in secondary industry, and at least 55 percent of the labor 
force in primary industry. 
 
Section 1.2: An Outline of Regional Economic Policies in China 
1.2.1: The Central Planning Period, 1949-1978 
Industrialization was shallow in 1949, and a largely coastal phenomenon.
5   In 
1952, the secondary sector produced 8 percent of GDP and employed 7 percent of the 
labor force compared with the primary sector, which produced 74 percent of GDP and 
employed 84 percent of the work force.  The coastal provinces had 72 percent of fixed 
assets, and accounted for 69 percent of the gross value of industrial output.
6  Naturally, 
just like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1917, CPC saw its most important 
economic task to be industrialization. 
China adopted the two key sets of guiding principles behind the Soviet 
development strategy: (a) the Marxist principles of common ownership with the state as 
trustee, and of generalized egalitarianism; and (b) the Stalinist practices of central 
planning for resource allocation, suppression of light industries and services in favor of 
                                                 
5 In this section, we use the classification of coastal, central and western provinces, which is the one 
commonly used in official publications. Coastal provinces include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hainan, and Shandong.  The central and 
western provinces are collectively called interior provinces.  Wang and Hu (1999) used two schemes: (a) 
metropolitan cities, eastern provinces, central provinces and western provinces (e.g. Table 3.1), and (b) 
coast, central and west (e.g. Table 6.1).  Wang and Hu's definition of coast corresponds to the official 
classification, and it equals, in their first classification, metropolitan cities plus eastern provinces plus 
Guangxi. 
6 The data are from Table 2.2 in Yang (1997).   8
heavy industries, and minimizing trade and financial linkages with the capitalist 
economies. 
Mao added a third guiding principle to China’s economic policy-making, the 
principle of regional economic self-sufficiency, a region should be self-sufficient not only 
in food production but also in industrial goods as well.  This third principle had 
unquestionably the greatest impact on regional economic outcomes.  The self-reliance 
principle had several virtues.  The first was that it overlapped with the egalitarian 
principle because it reduced provincial inequality, which Mao had identified to be one of 
the key social contradictions to be eliminated in the new China.
7   The second virtue was 
that the biggest beneficiaries of the self-reliance principle were the poorest provinces 
(because they were overwhelmingly agricultural), and this distributional outcome was in 
accordance with the gratitude that many veteran party leaders felt toward these provinces.  
Many of the poorest provinces were where CPC had retreated to and rebuilt their strength 
after the Kuomintang had driven it out of the urbanized areas.
8 
The third, and most decisive, virtue of self-sufficiency was that, beginning in 
1963, it coincided with the national security considerations of China.  The worsening 
Sino-Soviet political relationship and the growing military presence of the United States 
in Vietnam convinced Mao that regional economic self-sufficiency was key to China 
being able to engage in protracted defense of its territory.  Mao and his generals 
envisaged three lines of defense (coastal, central and western), and they decided in 1964 
on a massive construction of military-industrial complexes in western China, the third 
                                                 
7 Mao (1956). 
8 According to Lane (1998): “Yan’an [in Shaanxi] became the cradle of the Chinese revolution and earned 
a lasting place in the hearts of party members who lived there.... The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) 
targeted the province as a key site for industrial development, and 24 of the plan’s 156 major projects 
undertaken with Soviet assistance were located there.”   9
line of defense, popularly translated as the “Third Front.”  To minimize the vulnerability 
of the third front industries to air attacks, Lin Biao, then the Defense Minister and Mao’s 
designated successor, instructed that these projects be located “in mountains, in 
dispersion, and in caves.”
9 
The first two virtues of the self-sufficiency principle helped to ensure that the 
First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) allocated 56 percent of state investment to the interior 
provinces, and that the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) allocated 59 percent.  As the 
concern for national security grew in the early 1960s, the Third Five-Year Plan (1966-
1970) allocated 71 percent of state investment in the interior provinces, with the bulk of it 
in Sichuan, Hubei, Gansu, Shaanxi, Henan, and Guizhou.  Furthermore, many companies 
in Shanghai and other coastal cities were relocated to the mountains in Guizhou, Sichuan, 
and Hubei, where highways and railroads were deficient or non-existent, water and 
electricity were in shortage, and the sources of raw materials were far away.  A 
significant proportion of the relocated factories could not produce anything for many 
years, with the equipment rusting into junk.  
Post-mortem studies of the third front industries concluded that: 
“only half of the factories built performed to design specifications and the rest 
were either only partially completed (30 percent) or not completed at all (20 
percent).  Fully one-third of the total investment was wasted...”
10 
 
The pouring of investment funds into the interior provinces was a clear violation 
of the comparative advantage principle.  The growth of the interior provinces not only 
occurred at the expense of the coastal provinces, it also lowered the overall growth rate of 
                                                 
9 Quoted in Yang (1997, pp. 19) 
10 Yang (1997, pp. 19) who also reported that 100 yuan of fixed asset investment in 1978 yielded 70 yuan 
of output from the third front enterprises compared to 141 yuan from the coastal enterprises.  The profit rate 
in 1978 was 9 percent for the third-front enterprises compared to 23 percent for coastal enterprises.   10
the economy.   The wastage that occurred with this discrimination against coastal 
investments was further increased because of the poor planning, poor execution and poor 
management of the investments in the interior provinces.  What should have been 
important for the government was not where the investments were located but whether 
the dividends from the investments were used to enhance the development of the interior 
provinces. 
A policy shift occurred in 1972.  China began reducing its discrimination against 
investments in the coastal provinces and increasing its economic interaction with the 
capitalist economies.  The policy shift occurred because the government realized that 
China’s economy and technological capacity was falling further behind the rest of the 
world.  If this negative trend were not reversed, China might not be able to defend itself.  
Furthermore, because the Soviet Union was fast becoming a bigger threat than the United 
States, an invasion through the traditional land route by the Soviet Union had become 
much more likely than a coastal landing by armed forces supported by the United States.  
The national security justification for the third front industries was hence undermined.  
Economic modernization required the import of foreign technology, and this necessitated 
that China increased its export earnings. 
With the improvement of Sino-US relations on course after Kissinger’s secret 
visit in July 1971, the coastal enterprises, especially those in Guangdong, were expanded 
in order to increase their export capacity.  Total export earnings jumped from US$2.6 
billion in 1972 to US$3.4 billion in 1973, and continued soaring to reach US$9.8 billion 
in 1978.  Just as national security considerations in the 1950s and 1960s have played a 
large part in justifying the bias in favor of investments in the interior provinces, national   11
security considerations in the face of changes in international politics in the 1970s helped 
to reverse this bias.  
 
1.2.2: The Market-Oriented Reforms Period, 1978-98
11 
The process of increased economic interaction with the outside world accelerated 
at the end of 1978 upon the decisive political victory by the rehabilitated cadres over the 
remnants of the Maoist establishment at the Third Plenum of the 11
th Party Congress.  
The emphasis on the domestic front was the decentralization of agricultural production, 
the decentralization of the fiscal system, and the deregulation of prices; and the emphasis 
on the international front was the Open Door Policy.   
Fiscal decentralization took the form of tax contracting between the central 
government and the provinces.
12  Each fiscal contract was individually negotiated, and it 
ranged from fixed lump-sum contracts for five years like in the cases of Guangdong and 
Fujian to highly complicated (province-specific) revenue-sharing formulae.  The 
provincial governments in turn negotiated individual revenue contracts with the local 
governments.  Since the marginal tax rate set by the central government varied 
tremendously across provinces, the incentive of the provincial and local governments to 
engage in local economic development in order to generate tax revenue also varied 
tremendously.  Given the importance of Shanghai to the central coffers, its marginal tax 
rate was set higher than that of most coastal provinces until the early 1990s. 
                                                 
11 There is a keen controversy about what are the fundamental economic mechanisms in the rapid growth of 
China after 1978.  Some economists (the experimentalist school) believe that the growth was enabled by 
the discovery of new non-standard economic mechanisms e.g. collectively-owned rural enterprises and 
fiscal contracting, while some other economists (the convergence school) see the growth as the result of 
moving toward a private market economy whereby best international practices are adopted and modified 
according to local conditions; see Sachs and Woo (2000, and forthcoming) for a review of this debate. 
12 For details, see Wong, Heady and Woo (1995).   12
The fiscal decentralization might have helped economic growth
13, but this led to 
state revenue declining from 35 percent of GDP in 1978 to 14 percent in 1992, producing 
a near fiscal crisis for the state.  The state lacked the funds to invest in infrastructure 
projects to remove production bottlenecks, and to undertake poverty alleviation 
programs.  The practice of each provincial government covering more of its expenditure 
from local revenue necessarily meant reduced development expenditure in the poorest 
provinces that had been receiving fiscal subsidies from the center.  The tax reform of 
1994 that had the value-added tax as its center-piece has reduced the discriminatory 
elements of the fiscal system, and restored the fiscal capacity of the state to help the 
poorer provinces. 
The deregulation of prices in the industrial sector mainly took the form of a dual 
track price system for industrial inputs.  Since the central and western provinces were the 
main suppliers of raw industrial materials, the continuation of artificially low prices for 
these industrial inputs meant that the dual track pricing system was in effect transferring 
income from the interior producers to the coastal factories.  The elimination of the dual-
track price system in the 1990-91 period was an equitable move from the viewpoint of 
regional disparity. 
The Open Door Policy consisted in attracting foreign direct investment and 
promoting foreign trade in targeted areas.  This opening up was initially limited to two 
southern provinces (Guangdong and Fujian), then gradually extended to larger 
geographical units: first along the coast, and then the inland provinces.  The open 
economic zones provided investors with various preferential tax treatments, exemptions 
                                                 
13 The evidence on this front is mixed, see the critical review in Woo (2001).   13
on duties and from labor regulations, etc.
14  The implementation of regional preferential 
policies has gone through 3 broad stages:  
Early 80s: limited extent to Guangdong and Fujian provinces, with the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in 1979-80. 
Mid to end of the 80s: coastal preference strategy enforcement, with the 
designation of Coastal Open Cities (COC), entitled to set up their own Economic and 
Technological Development Zones (ETDZ), in 1984, followed by the establishment of 
Coastal Open Economic Zones (COEZ) in 1985, an Open Coastal Belt (OCB) in 1988 
and the Shanghai Pudong New Area in 1990. 
Early 90s: further extension towards whole China, after Deng Xiaoping's southern 
tour in 1992. During this year, new open economic zones were officially started in Major 
Cities along the Yangtze River (MC), Border Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZ), 
Capital Cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions (CC), ETDZ and Bonded 
Areas (BA). 
FDI inflows did not respond immediately in large volumes to the establishment of 
the SEZs in southern China (1979 in Guangdong, and 1980 in Fujian), partly because out 
of caution and partly because the liberal regulatory framework began being introduced 
only in 1982.
15  FDI flows started pouring in only from 1984 onward (when it doubled 
from US$0.6 billion in 1983 to US$1.3 billion in 1984).  This jump in total FDI in 1984 
was not simply due to the opening of 14 Open Coastal Cities and 10 Economic and 
Technological Development Zones that year because there was an enormous rise in FDI 
                                                 
14 Details on the different preferential policies applied in these zones can be found in Yang (1997, chapter 
3), Ma (1999, chapter 7), Wang and Hu (1999, chapter 6), and Démurger (2000, annex 1). 
15 Jiang Zemin played a prominent role in getting the liberal regulatory framework for SEZs passed in 
November 1981; see Gilley (1998, pp.68).   14
into the existing SEZs.  FDI into Guangdong increased from US$245 million in 1983 to 
US$542 million in 1984, and FDI into Fujian increased from US$14 million to US$48 
million in the same period.  This acceleration in FDI in 1984 was most probably the 
result of foreigner investors being finally convinced by the opening of the 24 more FDI 
zones of China's commitment to economic integration into the world economy. 
The second large acceleration of FDI inflow occurred in 1992 when FDI went 
from US$4.4 billion in 1991 to US$11.0 billion in 1992.  This further increase in the 
confidence of foreign investors was doubtlessly brought about by Deng Xiaoping's call 
for increased economic openness when he toured southern China (the now famous 
nanxun, "southern inspection") in the beginning of 1992.  
The leading role of this selective open-door policy in regional growth has been 
emphasized by a great number of studies (e. g. Mody and Wang, 1997; Chen and Feng, 
2000; Démurger, 2000).  Most of them found that FDI had an impact on economic 
growth that went beyond its addition to the capital stock, FDI also provided competition 
to domestic firms and hence forced them to raise their productivity, generated 
demonstration effects that enable domestic firms to improve their operations, provided 
the training ground for future managers of domestic firms in the same industries.  
   15
SECTION 2.0: REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN CHINA SINCE 1952 
[the discussion in Section 2 should be complemented by examination of the 
figures and tables in file "Part B: Provincial Disparity – GDP and HDI"] 
 
Section 2.1: Provincial Growth Experiences 
Examination of the materials contained in Part B about the distribution of per 
capita GDP growth rates allows us to identify several sub-periods that are distinguished 
by their growth performance.
16  The sub-periods in Tables B.1 and B.2 correspond to the 
following policy episodes: 
•  1953-58: the normal centrally-planned economy  
•  1959-65: the Great Leap Forward, the economic collapse and recovery 
•  1966-78: the Cultural Revolution 
•  1979-84: first reform phase, emphasis on agriculture  
•  1985-91: second reform phase, Oskar Lange-inspired reforms 
•  1992-98: third reform phase, ultimate goal is a market economy with substantial 
diversification of ownership structure. 
  
Section 2.2: Provincial Income Disparity, 1952-1998 
Table B.3 of Part B shows the ranking of provincial income in key years of 
China’s economic history.  Three features stand out from the change in the ranking over 
time. 
                                                 
16 For formal statistical analyses of the factors behind the changes in the distribution of provincial income, 
see Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996); Bao, Chang, Sachs and Woo (2002); and Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, 
Chang and Mellinger (2002).   16
First, the chief beneficiaries of the planned period were Beijing, Qinghai and 
Ningxia, and the biggest losers of the reform period were Qinghai and Ningxia (as 
compared to their initial ranking).  The rise of Beijing’s relative standing, and its 
maintenance of the attained income rank, reflects its paramount political status in the 
country.  The initial large gains of Qinghai and Ningxia (up 10 and 8 places respectively), 
and the subsequent large reversals (15 and 10 respectively) showed the tremendous 
transfer of resources under the third front industrialization program. 
Second, there has been basically no change at the very top and the very bottom of 
the scale.  Indeed, the three metropolises remained the richest throughout the whole 
period and Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Guizhou remained the poorest provinces.  
Mobility, both upward and downward, is a middle-class phenomenon. 
Third, the provinces that improved their ranking most significantly during the 
reform period were the coastal provinces, especially Fujian, Shandong, and Hainan.  The 
traditional industrial bases of northern China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) and western 
provinces experienced a decline in the relative scale of regional per capita income. 
Table B.4 of Part B looks at inequality by focusing on the two tails of the income 
distribution, the movements in the gap between the five richest provinces and the five 
poorest provinces.  The absolute income gap has increased tremendously over both the 
planned and reform periods.  When we examine the gap in relative terms first by 
normalizing the absolute gap with the average national income, and second by the ratio of 
the two incomes, the evidence is mixed.  The relative gap decreased from 1.5 in 1978 to 
1.4 in 1998, but the income ratios rose from 3.4 to 3.6.  In any case, the widening of 
relative income in the reform period is small compared with the widening in the planned   17
period, confirming the conclusions drawn from the movements of the coefficient of 
variation. 
Figure B.1 of Part B summarises the evolution of provincial inequality in China 
by reporting the coefficients of variation of per capita provincial incomes during the 
191952-1998 period.  The coefficients of variation were constructed from two data 
samples.  The fist sample consisted of 28 provinces that had complete income data 
coverage for the 1952-98 period.  The coefficient of variation of the per capita income 
(measured in 1995 prices) of the 28 provinces, Cov28, increased significantly from 0.45 
to 0.54 over the 1958-60 phase of the Great Leap Forward campaign to boost output 
growth through a combined program of large-scale agricultural collectivization and large-
scale investments in heavy industries.  The flow of investment funds to the existing 
industrial bases in the Northeast was so massive that real per capita GDP in 1958 jumped 
40 percent in Liaoning, 25 percent in Jilin and 34 percent in Heilongjiang.  
Unfortunately, the growth strategy of the Great Leap Forward turned out to be 
disastrously wrong.  The resulting economic crash created a nation-wide famine that 
brought the country to subsistence level, a feat that had the fortuitous result of attenuating 
provincial income disparity drastically, as evidenced by Cov28 dropping to 0.38 in 
1961.
17  A steady increase in provincial income inequality accompanied the recovery 
from the depression (1962-65) and the renewed growth during the decade of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976).  Cov28 reached 0.68 in 1978, the eve of the implementation of 
                                                 
17 In 1961, real per capital GDP fell 57% in Liaoning, 23% in Jilin, and 45% in Heilongjiang.  Per capital 
income in these three provinces climbed back to their 1961 levels only in mid-1970s – a feature that 
indicates to us a general overstatement of output during the Great Leap Forward period.  It is estimated that 
about 30 million people starved to death during the four years of the Great Leap forward.   18
market-oriented economic reforms.  Cov28 reversed course temporarily to decline 
gradually to 0.62 in 1987-89 before resuming its upward march to reach 0.71 in 1998.   
Cov28 may not be a satisfactory indicator of inter-provincial inequality, however, 
because it gives Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin (which are metropolises with province-
level status) the same weight with the provinces that are much larger in population and/or 
land area.  We hence constructed another coefficient of variation, Cov25 that excluded 
these three province-level cities.  Cov25 shows a much lower degree of inequality than 
Cov28, and does not show the upward trend seen in Cov28 during the 1963-78 period.  
These two differences mean that the three major cities have always been substantially 
richer than the other provinces, and that the gap between them widened substantially 
during the period of orthodox socialist economic management.  The vast gulf that we see 
between urban and rural income in today's market economy is definitely not a new 
phenomenon. 
Both Cov25 and Cov28 are in agreement that a clear upward trend in provincial 
income inequality had emerged by 1992, and that the present level of provincial income 
disparity is unprecedented since the founding of the New China in 1949.  Cov25 
exceeded the 1961 peak of the Great Leap Forward in 1995, and then went on to reach 
0.43 in 1998.  
Table B.5 of Part B reports the 1999 provincial scores on the Human 
Development Index (HDI).  HDI is a broader indicator of per capita welfare than per 
capita GDP because it also takes life expectancy and education attainment into account.  
Not unexpectedly, the three richest metropolises (Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin) stood at 
the top of the HDI ranking.  The seven provinces at the bottom of the HDI ranking are   19
western provinces, and they are -- in ascending order -- Tibet, Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, 
Yunnan, Ningxia, and Sichuan.  The remaining five western provinces are ranked as 
follows: Inner Mongolia 22nd, Guangxi 21st, Shaanxi 20th, Chongqing 18th, and 
Xinjiang 15th.  Only one of the 12 western provinces is in the top half of the HDI 
ranking, and even then, barely so. 
Tibet’s life expectancy index and education attainment index were the lowest in 
China, and they were so low that they rendered Tibet’s HDI score to be the lowest in 
China even though Tibet’s income index (50.3) was higher than those of Shaanxi (49.7), 
Guangxi (49.9), Gansu (47.8), and Guizhou (41.3).  31
st-ranked Tibet had an income that 
was 22 percent higher than 30
th-ranked Guizhou, but education attainment in Tibet was 
only 59 percent of that in Guizhou (and 63 percent of that in Qinghai, which had the 
second lowest level of education attainment).  
The concern for social equity and social stability has led China’s top leaders to 
commit themselves to accelerating the economic growth of the interior provinces.  The 
budget for infrastructure investments in the poor provinces have increased substantially 
every year, and a Western Region Development Office has just been established under 
the State Council (the Chinese cabinet) to formulate a comprehensive development 
strategy and to coordinate its implementation. 
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SECTION 3.0: URBAN-RURAL INEQUALITY, 1980-2000 
[the discussion in Section 3 should be complemented by examination of the 
figures and tables in file "Part C: Urban-Rural Disparity and Household 
Registration"] 
 
A large part of income inequality in China has its origin in the inequality between 
urban and rural incomes.  Table C.1 of Part C shows that the two biggest urban-rural 
expenditure per capita ratios in 1980 were Gansu (3.18) and Yunnan (3.10), and the two 
lowest ratios were Shanghai (1.71), and Liaoning (1.87).  Tables C.1 and C.2 reveal two 
interesting points about the gap between urban and rural expenditure. 
First, the urban-rural ratios of these four provinces were all higher in 2000:  
Gansu (3.81), Yunnan (4.08), Shanghai (2.14), and Liaoning (2.48).  Roughly speaking, 
urban-rural inequality declined in the first decade of economic reforms but increased so 
significantly in the second decade that it was higher in 2000 than in 1980.  Of the twenty-
five provinces for which data is available in 1980, the urban-rural expenditure ratios 
declined in twenty cases during the 1980-1990 sub-period but went up in twenty-one 
cases over the entire 1980-2000 period.  The first reform decade was dominated by high 
agricultural productivity growth in the 1978-84 sub-period and then by the surge in 
industrial production by rural enterprises in the 1985-89 period.  This explosive industrial 
growth urbanized the most dynamic rural areas, and the large inflow of foreign direct 
investments after 1992 into the traditional urban centers of the coastal provinces made 
economic growth an increasingly urban-based phenomenon.  The result of these   21
developments was an initial decline in the urban-rural expenditure ratio, followed by a 
large jump in the ratio. 
Second, the urban-rural gaps are larger for the provinces with the lowest Human 
Development Index (HDI) scores than for the provinces with the highest HDI scores.  
The urban-rural expenditure ratio in 2000 for the five lowest HDI scores was 4.97 for 
Tibet, 3.90 for Guizhou, 3.44 for Qinghai, 3.81 for Gansu, and 4.08 for Yunnan.  The 
urban-rural expenditure ratio for the five highest HDI scores was 2.14 for Shanghai, 2.48 
for Beijing, 3.07 for Tianjin, 3.03 for Guangdong, and 2.48 for Liaoning.  This negative 
correlation between the size of the urban-rural gap and the welfare level might be 
attributable to more dynamic urban centers generating greater positive spillovers to their 
surrounding rural areas. 
Table C.3 attempts to capture the amount of migration of rural workers to urban 
areas by reporting the proportion of population in each province that did not have 
permanent registration status in the locations that they were residing in during the 2000 
census.  The proportion of non-permanent residents was 12.6 percent at the national level, 
and it is not surprising that the three rich metropolises, and the fast-growing coastal 
provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian had proportions much above the national 
average.  Less expected was that the poorer western provinces of Xinjiang and Ningxia 
also had proportions above the national average.  This may reflect the rural migration 
induced by the recently initiated urban-based development projects in these western 
provinces. 
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SECTION 4.0: GENDER INEQUALITY, ILLITERACY, LIFE 
EXPECTANCY, AND INFANT MORTALITY RATE 
[The maps and data for Section 4 are in file "Part D: Urban-Rural Disparity 
and Household Registration"]   23
SECTION 5.0: ENVIRONMENT I: SOLID WASTE FROM 
INDUSTRIES AND HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 [The maps and data for Section 5 are in file "Part E: Pollution Solid Waste – 
Industrial and Household "] 
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SECTION 6.0: ENVIRONMENT I: AIR POLLUTION 
 
 [The maps and data for Section 6 are in file "Part F: Pollution Air "] 
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SECTION 7.0: ENVIRONMENT III: WATER POLLUTION 
 
 [The maps and data for Section 7 are in file "Part F: Pollution Water"] 
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